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INTRODUCTION
As civil aviation moves with amazing rapidity toward peacetime use of the many
wartime achievements in the aviation field, one of the most important subjects is
governmental jurisdiction over civil aviation. Leaders in the field of civil aviation
are watching anxiously the legislative developments on Federal, state and local levels
as "complete freedom of National and International trade and commerce depends
entirely upon man-made laws."' That defects exist in present laws is readily appar-
ent from the pending proposals to broaden Federal, state and local jurisdictions in
the aviation field. On the Federal level, the McCarran 2 and Lea3 Bills are a rather
sweeping rewrite and expansion of Federal jurisdiction to plug the loopholes in ex-
isting laws which experience has demonstrated an urgent need for. There is also
proposed legislation in the tort liability field4 and the airport field5 On the state
level, the current legislative campaigns to secure adoption of the Model State Aero-
nautics Department Act G a Model State Airport Act, a Model State Airport Zoning
Act,7 and a Uniform State Air Carrier Bill' are evidence of a concerted drive to
assert state jurisdiction over various phases of civil aviation. On the local level, there
is intensive activity, chiefly in the airport and airport zoning fields, to adapt local
legal powers and regulations to the "Air Age" which is upon us.
The purpose of this article is to examine the jurisdictions which the Federal,
state and local governments have already asserted in the field of civil aviation rather
than to discuss in detail the merits of suggested changes which these pending legis-
lative proposals would effect.
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I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
(A) Sources and Scope
Federal legislation in the aviation field took the form of appropriations for air
mail service9 up until the adoption of the Air Commerce Act of 1926.10 By this Act,
jurisdiction was assumed over safety matters in the field of civil aviation. These
covered examination and licensing of pilots and mechanics, registering and licensing
of airplanes, issuance of certificates of airworthiness for airplanes, inspection of air-
craft, air traffic rules and rating of airports.1Y'
The Congress had amended the Air Commerce Act slightly' 2 and adopted more
air mail legislation, with some of the latter containing various economic regulations
applicable to air mail carriers,"3 before 1938 when it adopted the Civil Aeronautics
Act' 4 to supersede all the air mail legislation and most of the Air Commerce Act.Y
The jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government over aviation in the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 is twofold in its coverage. First, the Act provides for the
regulation of certain economic aspects'" of air services, such as the issuance of cer-
tificates of public convenience and necessity, the supervision of rates, consolidations
of air services, and interlocking relationships. In other words, the economic reg-
ulatory aspects of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 deal with governmental control
and supervision over the business activities of air transportation. The safety regula-
tions17 provided for in the Act are concerned with such measures as the airworth-
iness of airplanes, the competency of airmen, safety at airports, and control over
airplanes while engaging in flight. The Act also gives the President, the Secretary
9 The Air Mail Act of 1925, 43 STAT. 805 (925) 39 U. S. C. §461 (1928). See DAVID, THE Eco-
NOmIICS OF AIR MAIL TRANSPORTATION (1934) 8, and R'NE, CIVIL AERONAUTICS Aar ANNOTATED
(1939) 14-19, for reference to appropriations for army carriage of the mail before civil aviation took
over this task in 1925.
10 44 STAT. 568 (1926) 49 U. S. C. §171 (1928). See LEE, LEGIsLATIvE HIsToRY OF THE AIR CoMt-
mERcE ACT' OF 1926 (1928), where the author discusses or includes the following: (I) The text of the
Air Commerce Act of 1926, the Committee reports and other material relating to its legislative history;
(2) articles and reports, together with two unpublished court decisions, relating to legal problems pre-
sented by civil air navigation; (3) materials relating to state legislation upon civil air navigation, including
the text of the Uniform State Aeronautics Law and a digest of State regulatory legislation; (4) the text
of the two international conventions relating to civil air navigation, which the United States has signed
but not ratified.
"1See 1928 U. S. Av. R. 365-431 for the full text of the first Air Commerce Regulations issued
under the Air Commerce Act of 1926.
12 45 STAT. 1404 (1929), 48 STAr. 933 (1934), 49 U. S. C. §171 (934). Also The Air Commerce
Act of r926-mendments of x934 (1934) 5 AIR L. REV. 346-35o; SCHMFECREDIER, THE AERONAUTICS
BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE: ITS HISTORY, ACIvITIES AND ORGANIZATION (1930); Williams,
Federal Legislation Concerning Civil Aeronautics (1928) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 798.
"' See SPENCER, AIR MAIL PAYMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT (1941) 40-100; GOODMAN, GOVERNMENT
POLICY TowARD COMIERCIAL AVIATION (1944) DAVID, supra note 9, and RHYNE, supra note 9, at 24-36.
14 52 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §401 (1940).
2' See RHYNE, supra note 9.
1 8 Title IV, secs. 401 to 416 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §§481-495 (1940). See also the Economic Reg-
ulations issued pursuant to the Act by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
"'Tide VI, secs. 6ox to 61o of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §§55s-56o (1940). See also the Civil Air Reg-
ulations issued pursuant to the Act by the Civil Aeronautics Board. 14 CoDE FED. RECS. (CUtM. SuPs.)
§oi et seq.
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of State, and the Civil Aeronautics Board jurisdiction over international aviation
matters0
8
That Congress envisoned aviation as a matter that is international and national
in scope is indicated by the Congressional direction to the Board (Authority) 8 "
to consider as "being in the public interests and in accordance with the public con-
venience and necessity," the following:
"The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly adapted
to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense."' 9
The Civil Aeronautics Act was passed under the Commerce Clause of the Federal
Constitution after various other Federal Constitutional powers had been considered2
In an early study, the Federal Aviation Commission had recommended the
adoption of a constitutional amendment giving to the Federal Government exclusive
control over all phases of civil aeronautics within the United States, if the states
did not adopt uniform regulatory laws within a reasonable length of time.' In
i919, by formal treaty, all nations were declared to own the space over the lands
within their respective borders,22 and some writers had suggested that the Federal
Government gain exclusive control over aeronautics by use of the treaty powers.P
This would be done by invocation of the doctrine of the famous case of Missouri V.
Holland.' In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that when
the Federal Government made a treaty with Canada as to migratory birds, such
treaty superseded all state legislation in conflict therewith. The District Courts had
's See Rhyne, Legal Rules for International Aviation (1945) 31 VA. L. REv. 267, at 286 et seq.
"' The title was changed from Civil Aeronautics Authority to Civil Aeronautics Board by Presi-
dential Reorganization Plan No. IV in 1940. See SECOND ANNUAL REPORT oF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS
AU TiSoI (1940) 57-6o.
"o Sec. 2(a) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §402(a) (1940).
'" "The Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes"; Art. i, Sec. 8, Cl. 3. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
(U. S.) i (x824) (supremacy of power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce); Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399-400 (1913); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938)
(extent of power of the Congress to regulate interstate commerce).
21 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION CoatmissIoN, SEN. Doc. No. 15, 74th Cong., ist Seas. (Jan. 30,
1935) 237-238.
"Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5234 and H. R.
4652, 75 th Cong., ist Sess. (March-April, 1937) 87-89, 250, 256. (The International Convention on
Aerial Navigation held in Paris in 1919.)
"BoGERT, PRoBLEms IN AVIATION LAW (1921) 306; Greer, Aviation from a Legal Point of View
(1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 308; Logan, Recent Developments in Aeronautical Law (i934) 5 J. ov AIR L
548, 563; Note (934) 5 AR L. REv. 346, 347. See also Wigmore, Did the Federal Government Ac-
quire Exclusive Aerial Jurisdiction Two Years Ago (1933) 4 J. oF AIR L. 232-235. He states: "In the
Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, signed at Habana on February 2o, 1928, and ratified
by the President March 6, 1931, occurs the following innocent-looking sentence (article 32): 'The con-
tracting States shall procure as far as possible uniformity of laws and regulations governing aerial navi-
gation.'" Dean Wigmore raises the query whether under the case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S.
416 (1920) the above treaty could not enable the Federal Government to acquire exclusive aerial juris-
diction. Also see McCormick, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Over Aviation via International Treaties
(i 935) 6 AIR L. REv. 13-33.24252 U. S. 416 (1920).
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previously held that the Federal Government could not control migratory birds by
a Federal statute passed under the Commerce Clause.25
Use of the admiralty power had also been suggested as a basis for Federal regu-
lation of civil aeronautics2 8 The "Air Commerce Act of x926" was patterned upon
the water navigation laws, but its regulatory power is based upon the power to
regulate interstate commerce. 2
While Federal aviation statutes are based upon the Commerce Clause,2" the ex-
tent to which the Congress has asserted Federal jurisdiction over civil aviation de-
pends upon the terms of the legislation which it has adopted. This legislation is
examined in the next two sections.
(B) Safety Jurisdiction
The extent of Federal jurisdiction over safety factors is based on the definition
of "air commerce" which, according to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 includes :2
i. Interstate, overseas, and foreign air commerce;
2. The transportation of mail by aircraft;
3. Any operation or navigation of aircraft within the limits of any civil airway;
4. Any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects interstate, overseas,
or foreign air commerce; and
5. Any operation or navigation of aircraft which may endanger safety in interstate,
overseas, or foreign air commerce.
It must be emphasized that the latter two provisions grant to the Federal agency
the power to regulate any flying which may affect or endanger safety in interstate
commerce, whether such flight be of an interstate or an intrastate character. It
should be further noted that the interstate flight to be protected may be within or
without the system of Federal civil airways. It is difficult even to imagine any flight
that is not at least a potential menace to interstate flight when one considers the
hundreds of thousands of miles in interstate commerce flown annually by the sched-
uled commercial airlines alone.
Under this broad definition of "air commerce" the Board promulgated regula-
tions requiring a Federal license for all aircraft30 and all airmen"1 regardless of
"United States v. Shauver, 2X4 Fed. 154 (E. D. Ark. 1914); United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed.
288 (D. Kan. 1915).
"See LEE, op. cit. supra note io; Bogert, op. cit. supra note 23, at 304; Ewing, "Right of Flight"
(speech delivered at Law School of University of Alabama, 1931, published in 1932 in pamphlet form).
H. R. 146ox, 7ist Cong. (May 13, 1930) was an aircraft regulation bill based on this power. Knauth,
Aviation and Admiralty (1935) 6 AIR L. REv. 226; Notes: (1934) 5 AIR L. REV. 346-350; (1914) 28
HARe. L. REv. 2oo; (915) 3 CAL. L. REv. 143-144. Report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law
Reform of the American Bar Association, Proposed Federal Air Act (91) 36 A. B. A. J. 379-386.
Veeder, The Legal Relation Between Aviation and Admiralty (1931) 2 Ati. L. REV. 29.
"See LEE, op. cit. supra note io.
"sSee supra note 20.
" Sec. 1(3) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §401(3) (1940).
"0 Sec. 61o(a) (i) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §56o (1940), implemented by the Civil Air Regulations,
14 CODE Fa. REGS. (CUMe. SuPP.) §6o.31.
"
1 Sec. 61o(a) (r) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §560, implemented by §6o.30 of the Civil Air Regula-
tions, 14 CODE FED. REGS. (CuM. SuPP.) §60.30.
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whether either or both are engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, regardless
of whether the flight is of a commercial or non-commercial nature, and regardless of
whether the flight takes place on or traverses a civil airway. In other words, any
airman or aircraft engaged in flying of any sort in the airspace overlying the United
States is required pursuant to the Safety Regulations to have a Federal license.
In the only two cases thus far challenging the extensiveness of this exercise of
Federal power, the Federal Courts have sustained the regulations, upholding their
application to: (i) an aircraft flying purely intrastate within a Federally designated
civil airway and having no Federal certificate of airworthiness although having one
issued by the state;3- (2) an operator who, having no Federal pilot's certificate (as
well as disregarding certain other provisions of the Federal regulations) made two
non-scheduled off-the-airways flights, one such flight being wholly within one state. a
In the latter case, the Drumm case,34 the operator was penalized for violation of
the regulations even on his intrastate flight. In the former case, the Rosenhan case,-3
the court made the point that Congress did not limit the question of safety to a
manifestation of actual danger; rather, it could and did exert its power to eliminate
all potential elements of danger.
An important question in the problem of Federal-State Jurisdiction which is
directly related to the issue decided in the Drumm case is whether .the assertion of
power by Congress over an area of intrastate commerce deprives the states of power
to regulate the same subject or closely related subjects. Whether the assertion of
Federal power over all aircraft and airmen flying in any part of the airspace of the
United States prevents the states from exerting any control over the same factors
was not in issue in the Drumm case and has not, therefore, been judicially deter-
mined. It is quite possible that a decision on this question may not be forthcoming
for a number of years in view of the fact that the tendency of state law with respect
to such safety factors has been to follow the Federal licensing requirements. Most
states require a Federal license for aircraft and airmen. A great many of the state
'laws merely provide -that the Federal license be registered with some agency of the
state. A few states require both a Federal and a state license and in most of these
instances, the state license is, in effect a certificate of registration or "recordation"
of the Federal license. Other states require either a Federal or a state license and
in only four states is a state license alone sufficient to engage in intrastate flightsY8
These state laws are examined later herein in detail in discussing state safety
jurisdiction.
There is a substantial body of precedent of long standing to be found in Supreme
Court decisions to the following effect: Congress may regulate intrastate commerce
in order to regulate interstate commerce, even to the exclusion of a state's power to
'" Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F. (2d) 932 (C. C. A. xoth, 1942).
"' United States v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. (D. Nev. 1944) 151
3, Ibid.
35 Supra note 32.
36 See WATEmtAN, THE ROLE OF THE STATEs IN POSTWAR AVIATION (Bur. of Pub. Administration,
Univ. of Cal, 1945) 48-50.
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legislate concerning commerce within the state's boundaries where (x) the regula-
tion of such intrastate commerce is necessary in order to regulate effectively inter-
state commerce; and (2) where Congress manifests a clear intent to regulate the
subject matter to the exclusion of the state or where the state and Federal Regula-
tions cannot both be given effect because ot repugnancy3 7
The Drumm3 case indicates that the Federal government has power to regulate
the licensing of airmen or aircraft engaged in intrastate flight.
While there is no express prohibition in the Civil Aeronautics Act forbidding
state regulation of safety matters, it is possible that the extremely broad powers
asserted over such matters by Congress might be interpreted by the Supreme Court
as indicative of Congressional intent to occupy the field exclusively 0 An examina-
tion of the criteria which has been accepted by the Supreme Court in the past as
sufficient to indicate such intent is a problem in constitutional law beyond the scope
of this article.
With respect to safety regulations, all authorities agree that uniformity of regula-
tion is not only desirable but absolutely essential to the public welfare. Exclusive
regulation by the Federal government obviously would assure such uniformity. Even
the most rabid defenders of states' rights admit that variations of any proportion in
state safety regulations could serve only to impede aviation progress. Such author-
ities propose, therefore, uniform supplementary legislation on the part of each of
the states, and these proposals are examined later herein in discussing state jurisdic-
tion. These so-called "Uniform Laws," it must be admitted, are well known for
their lack of uniformity.4" In 1939, the Committee on Aviation of the American
Bar Association withdrew its approval of a Uniform State Regulatory Act because
of doubt that uniformity could ever secure by means of such statutes.41 Even grant-
ing the advocates of uniform legislation by the states the unwarranted assumption
that all of the forty-eight states would pass an identical statute,42 there is no way to
insure uniformity of interpretation by the courts or the state aviation agency, nor to
insure unformity in the regulations issued under such statutes.
The most useful function the state could serve with respect to safety matters
would be that of assisting the Federal government in the enforcement of the Civil
Air Regulations if such a function is within the police powers of the states. This
point is again referred to in considering state safety jurisdiction infra where some
of the legal problems raised by such assistance are discussed.
(C) Economic Jurisdiction
While the constitutional power of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce
is just as broad with respect to economic regulatory jurisdiction as it is to safety
" Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533 (i912); International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 265
(1928); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (i94r). See Ryan, Economic Regulation of Air Commerce
by the States ('945) 31 VA. L. REV. 479, 490-502.
2 8Supra, note 33. " But cf. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1 (1937),
40 Ryan, op. cit. supra note 37, at 529. 41 64 A. B. A. R. 170 (1939).
42 See the comments on uniform statutes in Ryan, op. cit. supra note 37, at 529-530.
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regulatory jurisdiction, Congress did not see fit in passing the Civil Aeronautics Act
to exercise the commerce power as comprehensively with respect to Federal economic
regulation as it did with respect to Federal safety regulation. As has been stated
above, all aircraft and all airmen are subject to the safety requirements. No parallel
provision is made in the so-called "economic" sections of the Act. Rather, the Act
applies its economic sections only to carriers engaged in air transportation, which
term, by a series of definitions in the Act, means the carriage by aircraft of persons
or property as a common carrier" for compensation or hire or the carriage of mail
in interstate commerce. Consequently, the economic regulations promulgated by
the Board do not extend to private and contract carriers by aircraft, regardless of
whether or not such carriers engage in interstate, overseas or foreign commerce.
That Congress has power to regulate any carrier, whether common or private,
engaging in interstate commerce admits of no doubt; why Congress excluded pri-
vate and contract carriers from the terms of the Act poses an interesting, if specu-
lative, problem 5
Another section of the Act46 provides in part that "no air carriers shall engage
in any air transportation unless there is in force a certificate issued by the Authority
(Board) authorizing such air carrier to engage in such air transportation. . ."
Other sections of the Act provide that the Board shall issue a certificate of public
convenience and necessity if it finds that an applicant is fit, willing, and able to per-
form such transportation properly and if it finds that such transportation is required
by the public convenience and necessity. 7 Under the statute the Board was given
power to classify common carriers by aircraft for purposes of economic regulation
and to prescribe the character and degree of regulation and to exempt from such
regulation in the public interest to avoid undue burden.48 In 1938, the Board issued
an exemption order which provided for the exemption of non-scheduled common
"Sec. i(io) and (21)(a) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. (1940) §401(lO) and (21)(a).
"Cases holding particular air carriers to be common carriers are: Curtiss-Wright Flying Service,
Inc. v. Glose, 66 F. (2d) 71o (C. C. A. 3 d, 1933), cert. den. 29o U. S. 696; Ziser v. Colonial Western
Airways, Inc., io N. J. M. 1118, 16z Ad. 591 (1932); Hagymasi v. Colonial Western Airways, Inc.,
1931 U. S. Av. R. 73 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1931) affirmed io N. J. Misc. 1118, 162 Ad. 591 (1932). Bolle
v. Colonial Western Airways, Inc., 1io N. J. L. 46, 164 Ad. 436 (1932); Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal.
714, 5 P. (2d) 69o, 12 Pac. (2d) 933 (1932); Turgeon v. Quebec Airways, Ltd., 1942 U. S. Av. R.
201( Super. Ct. Quebec, 1942); Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc., 1934, U. S. Av. R. 21 (N.
Y. Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co., 1933), as affirmed 266 N. Y. 244, 194 N. E. 692; Law v. Transcontinental Air
Transportation, Inc., 1931 U. S. Av. R. 205 (U. S. E. D. Pa., 1931); McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Fly-
ing Service, Inc., 269 Ill. App. 5o2 (1933). Cases holding particular air carriers not to be common
carriers are: Bird v. Louer, 272 Il. App. 552 (1933); Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., 1929 U. S.
Av. R. 48 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co., 1929), reversed on other grounds, 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N.
Y. S. 251; North American Accident Insurance Co. v. Pitts, 213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21 (1928); Brown v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 8 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1925).
" One can speculate on the intent of Congress in inserting the proviso: "That the Authority (Board)
may by order relieve air carriers who are not directly engaged in the operation of aircraft in air trans-
portation from the provisions of this Act to the extent and for such periods as may be in the public
interest." For details of this relief, see Neal, The Status of Aron-Scheduled Operations under the Civil
Aeronautics Xct of z938, infra this symposium, p. 5o8.
"Sec. 401(a) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §481(a) (1940).
"Sd. at (d) ( ).Sec- 416(a) and (b) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §496(a) and (b) (1940).
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carriers from certain requirements of the economic regulations." Consequently,
only common carriers operating scheduled services in air transportation, as defined
by the Act, have thus far been subject to the economic regulations of the Board, and
only common carriers engaged in interstate, overseas, and foreign air transportation
by aircraft are subject in any way to such economic regulations.
It has long been established that the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce is plenary. It is equally well established that in, regulating interstate com-
merce Congress may regulate intrastate activities which may burden or interfere
with Federal control of interstate commerce. To what extent Congress, under the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, has exerted its power to regulate the economic activ-
ities of air carriers of an intrastate nature is as yet an unsettled question. The juris-
diction asserted by the Act over safety matters is extremely broad; it specifically
includes "any operation or navigation of aircraft within the limits of any civil air-
way or any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may
endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce.""0  By limiting
economic jurisdiction to interstate, overseas and foreign air carriers who are "com-
mon carriers" the Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act certainly did not write
into the Act the specific ideas of broad jurisdiction which are included in the safety
provisions just quoted. The jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board over intra-
state economic operations would, therefore, seem to depend on the extent to which
particular cases of intrastate air commerce are related to interstate air commerce."'
While intrastate air transportation in the United States in principle remains under
state control, like all borderlines the line between Federal and state jurisdiction over
intrastate air transportation is difficult to draw.5 2  It is possible that intrastate air-
lines transporting passengers or property, which may be considered as being in the
stream of interstate or foreign commerce, can be subjected to Federal jurisdiction.
At least with respect to the Federal requirement of the certificate of convenience and
necessity, a Federal District Court has so held, in the Canadian Colonial Airways
case. 5 3  (The carrier voluntarily discontinued the service between New York City
and Niagara Falls, New York, and a consent decree was entered permanently enjoin-
ing the carrier from operating such a service without having been certificated by
the Civil Aeronautics Board. 3') This is the only instance in which the power of
the Federal government to regulate a physically intrastate air operation has been
before the courts. The implications of this decision are far-reaching, for it is diffi-
4 14 CODE FD. REas. (Cue. Supp.) §292.x.
" Sec. 1(3) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §401(3) (1940).
" The term "air commerce" is used in its technical sense in the treatment of safety regulation, that
is, with the meaning given the term by definition in Sec. x() of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §40X(3) (1940).
But in that part of the Act dealing with economic regulations, "commerce" or "air commerce" is used
in its ordinary legal sense.
"
2 See Ryan, op. cit. supra note 37; Willebrandt, Federal Control of Air Commerce (1940) 11 J. O
AIR L. "D CO.M. 204; Morris, State Control of Aeronautics (1940) It id. 32o; Taylor, A Practical
Reconciliation of State and Federal Control (941) 12 id. 232.
' C. A. B. v. Canadian Colonial Airways, 41 F. Supp. ioo6 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
"' ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL AERONAuTIcs BOARD (1941) 36.
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL AVIATION 467
cult to imagine an air service of any magnitude which would not in some way
"affect" interstate commerce even though such service be operated entirely within
the boundaries of a single state. Such intrastate operations may parallel, compete
or connect with an interstate air carrier in such a way as to affect interstate air trans-
portation by diverting traffic, or by "supplying" passengers and cargo to an inter-
state carrier (the so-called "feeder" airline operation). Since air transportation is
primarily a long distance operation rather than local in scope, it is unlikely that any
air service though operated within the boundaries of a single state could long sur-
vive without depending to a greater or lesser degree on an aviation market which
traverses state lines. 4
The jurisdiction asserted by the Federal government in the economic regulatory
field seems comparatively limited not only by the narrow definition given the term
"air transportation" but also due to the fact that there has been no attempt by the
National Government to extend (except with respect to the Canadian Colonial opera-
tion just described) and thereby define more accurately its economic jurisdiction by
means of the usual constitutional principles relating to the commerce power.
II. STATE JuMsDICTION
(A) Safety Regulation
All of the states have legislation covering various phases of air safety regulation
Forty states require that all aircraft and all pilots have a Federal license. Of the
eight states "' which have no such requirement, six require either a state or Federal
license,"' and two require only a state license for both aircraft and pilots.57 Virginia
requires both a state and Federal license for aircraft and pilots. Eleven states have
adopted air traffic rules substantially identical with the Federal Air Traffic Rules,"
twenty-three59 have air traffic regulations which make no reference to the Federal
rules but which are usually based in part upon them, and fourteen6 ° have no pro-
vision on this subject.
It has been held that while a state may prescribe air traffic regulations for intra-
state traffic,"' a statute which fixes no criterion to be adhered to by the State Aviation
Commission in establishing such regulations is invalid as it violates the fundamental
"' See Ryan, op. it. supra, note 37, at 518-522, 5o6 for an economic analysis of intrastate air trans-
portation and the articles cited supra note 52.
"
5 The states which do not have this requirement are: Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah.
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah.
Alabama and Connecticut.
s Kentucky, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin.
" Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
" Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, 'West Virginia, and Wyoming
"People v. Katz, 140 Misc. 46, 249 N. Y. Supp. 719 (1931); Parker v. Granger, 4 Cal. (2d) 668,
52 P. (2d) 226 (1935), app. dism. 298 U. S. 644 (1936); Erickson v. King, 218 Minn. 98, 15 N. W.(2d) 201 (1944).
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principle of Constitutional law that an uncontrolled statutory delegation of legis-
lative power is void.62 Federal and state air traffic regulations govern when they
conflict with local regulations governing the landing and take-off of airplanes at
airports.63
Adoption by the states of the Federal Air Safety Regulations does create certain
legal questions. One lower court has held invalid state legislation authorizing the
state agency to conform to then or thereafter existing Federal regulations (Federal
Traffic Rules for landing and taking off at airports);o4 another lower court has in-
validated a state law forbidding operation of aircraft without a Federal aircraft and
pilot license. 5 These courts viewed the legislation as an unconstitutional delegation
of state legislative power to the Federal government. In the latter case, the court by
dictum stated that it would not be an unwarranted delegation of the legislative au-
thority of the state to prescribe by statute that standards of construction of airplanes
and qualifications of pilots must conform to the requirements of the Federal govern-
ment. Minnesota amended her statute to include such a provision. 0 It is noteworthy
that the State Aeronautic Department Act which the National Association of State
Aviation Officials approved in November, 1944, and which was proposed for adop-
tion by the forty-four states holding legislative sessions in 1945 provides:
"All rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission under the authority of this
Act shall be kept in conformity, as nearly as may be, with the then current Federal legis-
lation governing aeronautics and the regulations duly promulgated thereunder and rules
and standards issued from time to time pursuant thereto." 67
A footnote to the text by the authors of this proposed Act explains that this pro-
vision has been drafted in this form to avoid constitutional objections of delegation
of state legislative powers to the Federal government. s Insofar as the licensing of
aircraft, airmen, and air flight instructors is concerned, this proposed Act "does no
more than to require the registration of Federal licenses, permits, and certificates.""0
62State v. Larson, io N. J. Misc. 384, x6o At. 556 (1932); cf. Schechter Corp. v. United State, 295
U. S. 495 (1935).
"Rinehart v. Woodward Flying Service, 122 W. Va. 392, 9 S. E. (2d) 5z (1940).
" State v. Larson, supra note 62.
"Neiman v. Brittin, 235 C. C. H. §28o, 1935 U. S. Av. R. x59 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 22, 1935).
"Minn. Laws of 1935, Chap. 358, Sees. 2 and 3, 1935 U. S. Av. R. 384. See Report of American
Bar Association Committee on Aeronautical Law, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 315, 323, 330.
"
7 Sec. 6, subdivision 4, of the proposed Act.
"8 This footnote states:
'The laws of a number of states use the language 'shall be consistent with and conform to the then
current federal legislation,' etc., or its equivalent. The question arises as to the constitutionality of a
state statute adopting federal legislation or rules which may be enacted or prescribed in the future, thus
surrendering legislative power to the congress or a federal bureau. On the other hand, if legislation and
regulations existing at the time of the enactment of the state statute were adopted by reference, no oppor-
tunity would be given for keeping step with new legislation and regulations. The suggested language,
therefore, seems preferable, because such a provision is valid and should be preferred to the gesture of
an invalid provision."
"Quoted from the explanatory footnote to Section 9 of the proposed Act. The full text of the
footnote states:
"In drafting this proposed regulatory section it has been the aim to avoid interference with proper
federal regulation and at the same time, in the interest of the public, to enable the states to enforce
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This Act should be taken as representing present state official thinking on the juris-
diction states want to assume in safety matters in the aeronautical field, as state
officials drafted and are now sponsoring this Act.
It is readily apparent that the states want to go as far as they can legally go in
adopting Federal safety regulations so as to assure the maximum amount of uni-
formity. Whether the proposed Act avoids the charge of infringing upon a juris-
diction already asserted by the Federal government is a question yet to be decided.
The analysis of Federal safety jurisdiction in the first part of this article leaves little
doubt but what the scope of activity left to the states in this field is indeed narrow.
To avoid legal challenge to state regulations which cover the same field as those
adopted by the Federal government, it has been suggested that the Civil Aeronautics
Act be amended to specifically authorize the states to enforce the Federal safety
regulations. The Attorney General of Florida has already held that his state's traffic
inspectors may enforce the Federal air traffic regulations which have been adopted
by Florida, but the inspectors may make arrests only in conjunction with peace
officers. 3 Another suggestion is that persons violating the Federal safety regulations
may be proceeded against in the state courts so as to prevent the flooding of the
Federal courts with air traffic cases.71
The chief current question is whether Federal safety jurisdiction already excludes
all state jurisdiction in the field. As already stated in discussing Federal safety
jurisdiction, the cases which have considered the extent of Federal jurisdiction have
not considered this problem. It may well be that Federal jurisdiction in this field
is so broad as to exclude state safety jurisdiction as the Drumm case7" certainly
indicates a tendency to go that far.
(B) State Economic Jurisdiction
Fifteen states have statutes containing economic regulations applicable to air
transportation.73 In general, these statutes require common carriers by air to obtain
certificates of public convenience and necessity before operating in the state with the
more recent statutes going farther and paralleling the economic regulations of the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. California prohibits ".... transportation of passengers
for hire ... between fixed termini over a route entirely within this State unless such
person holds a Federal certificate of authority."74
police regulations. In so far as the licensing of aircraft, airmen, and air flight instructors is concerned,
it does no more than to require the registration of federal licenses, permits, or certificates. A sentence
has been added to the ordinary provision to the effect that certificates of registration shall constitute
licenses in order to avoid possible constitutional objections. As to air schools, instructors in ground sub-
jects, and airports, it is felt that these are matters entirely within the jurisdiction of the state."
"
0 Opinion of August 17, 1934, printed in full in 1935 U. S. Av. R. 117.
"See H. R. 3383, Sec. 4, 7 9 th Cong., ist Sess. (1945).
ia United States v. Drumm, supra note 33.
' Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
" Cal. Laws 1943, Ch. 868, 1943 U. S. Av. R. 230. See Wolcott, Does the Jurisdiction of the Cali-
fornia Railroad Commission Extend to Air Transportation? (1945) 33 CAL. L. REv. 114; McKeage, The
California Railroad Commission Has Jurisdiction Over Intrastate Rates and Charges of Airlines (1945)
id. at 299.
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Most oi this state legislation predates the Civil Aeronautics Act of x938 and little
has been done by the states having these statutes to regulate air carriersYr In 1944,
Virginia"m enacted legislation to provide regulation of the economic affairs of intra-
state air carriers and Rhode Island amended her law.7 In 1945, Alabama,78
Arkansas, 7 ' and Vermont,s ° adopted statutes of similar effect. The latter three
statutes were based upon the so-called Uniform State Air Carrier Bill drafted in x944
and sponsored by the National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners.
This Bill proposes state control over intrastate air carriers and over intrastate busi-
ness of interstate air carriers. The three states just named, however, deleted the
provisions relating to control over intrastate business of interstate air carriers.
There has been no court litigation involving the economic regulation by states
of air transportation, but some decisions of state commissions in passing on economic
matters have been reported. While these decisions are rather old in terms of the
history of air transportation-all except one of them pre-dates the Civil Aeronautics
Act of x938-they should be recorded here as of historical importance in considering
state economic jurisdiction over civil aviation. An applicant before the Arizona
Commission who refused to produce statistics as to its other operations was found
to have failed to meet the burden of showing that public convenience and necessity
required the service for which authorization was sought."' One who contracted to
dust crops with insecticide by airplane is not a "common carrier" and was held not
subject to the Arizona Commission's jurisdiction.8 2 In choosing between rival appli-
cants for service between the cities of Grand Junction and Denver, the Colorado
Commission made a factual finding as to the carrier best able to meet needs of the
public for air service and analyzed the principles which it must consider in making
such a decisionYs In another case, the Colorado Commission in i93o granted an
interstate air carrier a certificate of public convenience and necessity without proof
of need for the service in view of the Commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.8 '
The Illinois Commerce Commission granted an intrastate air carrier a certificate
of public convenience and necessity after finding facts showing that the carrier was
financially and technically able to conduct the proposed service.8 ' In Massachusetts,
although no law requires certificates of public convenience before air carriers began
operations, it has been held that rates charged by common carriers by aircraft are
7 See Davis, State Regulation of Aircraft Common Carriers (1930) 1 AIR L. Rav., 47; Ryan, op.
ct. supra note 37.
" Va. Laws 1944, Ch. 267. R. I. Laws 1944, H. B. No. 851.
"' Governor's Act No. 269, Ala. Acts 1945, H. B. 302. "' Ark. Laws 1945, Act No. 252,
"
0 Vt. Laws 1945, H. B. x89.
"
1 Application of Century Pacific Lines, P. U. R. 1932 C, 388, 1932 U. S. Av. R. go (1932).
"Quick Aviation Co. v. C. J. Kicinman, 6o Ariz. 430,. 138 P. (2d) 897 (1943).
"' Pikes Peak Air Company v. U. S. Airways, Inc., P. U. R. 1930 E, 308, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 253
(1930).
"'Application of U. S. Airways, Inc., P. U. R. 1928 E, 518, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 187 (1928).
" Application of Century Air Lines, et a!., 1932 U. S. Av. R. X97 (1931). See also Matter of
Northwest Airways, Inc., 3 AIR L. REv. 384 (Ill. Comm. Comm. May 4, 1932). See Opinion of Attorney
General of Illinois, 1944 U. S. Av. R. 46 (1944) holding that intrastate air carriers who are common
carriers must obtain such a certificate before beginning operations within that state.
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subject to regulation by the Department of Public Utilities."' In Nevada, the State
Commission, in issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity to three air
transport companies for service on call, provided that each should have, at its home
airport, a preference or priority of two hours over the others8 7 In Pennsylvania,
the State Public Service Commission in an early decision, 8 has outlined the general
principles it would follow in granting certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity to common carriers by air.
This review of all the reported decisions by the states on economic regulation of
air carriers reveals how little attention the states have given to this subject. Undoubt-
edly, the adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 virtually eliminated most of
the need for state legislation of this character. Since air transportation is primarily
long distance or interstate in character, there appears to be little of value which state
economic control can add to Federal economic regulation. Economic regulation by
forty-eight states could well be such a burden as to stifle civil aviation by the multi-
tude of varied regulations which these different regulating agencies would almost
certainly promulgate89
A further complication for state economic regulation of air carriers arises from
the fact that in most states the economic regulation is exercised by the State Utility
or Railroad Commission rather than tlp State Aeronautics Commission. Where
separate Commissions exist, an undercover fight usually goes on between these two
state agencies almost constantly over their respective jurisdictions and duties. It is
to be noted that the present Model State Aeronautics Department Act covering state
safety jurisdiction is sponsored by the State Aeronautics Commissions (National
Association of State Aviation Officials), and that those Commissions are opposed,
either openly or in fact, to the state economic jurisdiction provided in the Uniform
State Air Carrier Bill sponosored by the National Association of Railroad and Utility
Commissioners. Some contend that if state commissions charged with jurisdiction
over surface carrier utilities are now given jurisdiction over air carriers they will
favor surface carriers over air carriers and thereby retard the development of air
transportation.
At the present time, the Federal government clearly has economic regulatory
jurisdiction over all "common carriers" engaged in interstate, overseas and foreign
air transportation. It is doubtful, however, that the power is conferred by the Civil
Aeronautics Act on the Board to exert economic regulatory jurisdiction over all
intrastate air transportation. To the extent that the Federal authority may not ex-
tend to the interstate economic aspect of intrastate transportation, it may not cover
80 Opinion of Attorney General of Massachusetts, 1944 U. S. Av. R. 51 (i944).
'7 Application of Francis A. Riordan, et al., P. U. R. 1928 D, 854, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 185 (1928).
" Application of Gettysburg Flying Service, Inc., 8 Pa. P. S. C. R. 787, P. U. R. 1928 B, 287, 1932
U. S. Av. R. 181 (1927). In Application of Battlefield Airways, Inc., z7 Pa. P. S. C. R. 41o (1928) an
application for incorporation of an air transport corporation was denied on the ground that since one
company already operated in the proposed area of service the creation of a second company would result
in destructive competition.
"See Boren, National and State Regulation of Civil Aeronautics (1943) 89. CONG. Rac. A 1840,
and citations infra, note 103.
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all operations of the interstate airlines. It is not certain that the services such airlines
supply and the rates they charge for carriage between points within the boundaries
of a single state are subject to Federal jurisdiction. The Canadian Colonial Airways
proceeding, already referred to herein in discussing Federal economic jurisdiction,
suggests, however, the possibility that the Federal government may have jurisdiction
over the intrastate services and charges of an interstate airline.
In all other fields of public transportation where both the Federal and state gov-
ernments have attempted regulation thereof, the courts have been called upon to
determine the respective and relative areas of jurisdiction of the Federal and state
governmentsY ° Air transportation will be no exception.
In determining the validity of state statutes or regulations which may affect inter-
state commerce, the Supreme Court of the United States has evolved two tests in-
volving separate sets of criteria for two types of situations. In the first situation the
general rule is well stated in the leading case of Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens."'
There the court first formulated its theory that where the inherent nature of the
subject matter requires uniformity of treatment within all the states, the power
of Congress to legislate with respect thereto is exclusive. This doctrine, known as
the "Uniformity of Regulation" theory, has been affirmed repeatedly by the court.0 2
So, if the subject matter is one requiring uniform regulation throughout the states,
the power of Congress to regulate is exclusive; perhaps it would take a positive
manifestation of Congressional intent permitting the states to regulate before state
regulation would be upheld." Whether aviation is classifiable as such a subject
matter has never been decided by the court. It is, however, entirely conceivable that
it might be so considered by analogy to the power asserted by Congress over navi-
gable waters.Y4  No clear formula has been evolved by the courts whereby it is
ascertainable in advance of a decision whether or not a given subject matter admits
of only uniform and therefore national legislation.
In the second type of situation, that is, where the inherent nature of the subject
matter does not require uniformity, but rather admits of diversity of regulation, each
state may legislate respecting such matters and regulation by the states will be valid
until the Federal Governinent, through Congressional action, manifests an intent
either expressly or by implication to occupy the entire field. 5 After Congress acts,
the courts are then called upon to decide whether Federal and state laws respecting
the same subject conflict because of repugnancy or inconsistency. 0  In Oregon-
" See Tarney, Methods of Differentiating Interstate Transportation from Intrastate Transportation
(1938) 6 Gao. WASh. L. REv. 553.
92 12 How. (U. S.) 299 (1851).
"1Mobile County v. Kimball, io2 U. S. 69x (1881); Missouri ex rel. Bartlett v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 265 U. S. 298 (193i); Ashwander v. T. V. A., 297 U. S. 288 (1936); Houston R. C. v. United
States, 234 U. S. 342 (1941).
"Cf. cases in foregoing footnote.
"' Ashwander v. T. V. A., 297 U. S. 288, 328 1936); United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311
U. S. 377 1940).
"Clark Distillery Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917); Minnesota Rate Cases,
230 U. S. 352 (1913).
"IThe Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 342 (1914); Mapier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 272
U. S. 605 (1926).
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Washington R. & N. Co. v. Washington the court stated "... there is a field in
which the local interests of states touch so closely upon interstate commerce, that in
the silence of Congress on the subject, the states may exercise their police powers.
But when Congress has acted and occupied the field, the power of the states to act
is prevented.:" 7
It will be recalled that in a large measure the Federal government has occupied
the safety field insofar as the Federal Civil Air Regulations are applicable to all air-
craft and all airmen. Whether or not such occupation of the field excludes the
states from imposing supplementary safety rules is not clear. 8 With respect to the
economic regulatory field, however, it seems patent that Congress did not intend the
Federal government to exercise the broad jurisdiction asserted in the safety field.
The economic regulatory jurisdiction intended to be assumed by the Federal govern-
ment is limited by the Act itself. In this situation, the extent to which the Civil
Aeronautics Board can assert jurisdiction over the economic aspects of intrastate air
transportation depends in large measure on the language of the Act as interpreted
in legal precedents construing such language when used under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution. In this language and in these precedents will be found the
answer as to where to draw the line between the jurisdiction which the Congress has
asserted and the field of economic regulation left to the states.
It is well established that the commerce power extends to all activities which may
"affect" interstate commerce. 9 To the extent that the effective regulation of inter-
state commerce involves the regulation of intrastate commerce-a field ordinarily
reserved to the respective states-Congress may legislate0 0 concerning such intrastate
commerce, and may legislate to the exclusion of the states where its manifests a
clear intention to occupy the field exclusively.' In the light of such interpretations
of the Commerce Clause, the assertion by the Civil Aeronautics Board of jurisdiction
over the intrastate operations of Canadian Colonial Airways, an interstate carrier,
does not seem a usurpation of state power over intrastate commerce. Whether the
Civil Aeronautics Board can assert jurisdiction over intrastate air transportation of
intrastate air carriers on the grounds that the regulation of such transportation is
essential to the effective regulation of interstate transportation will depend upon
substantial factual findings by Congress to that effect. Ample precedent can be
found by looking in other public utility fields, particularly as respects public carriers,
both by railroad and by water vehicles.'02
It is certain from this short survey that there is a most pressing need for Federal
legislation to clarify Federal jurisdiction over economic phases of air transportation
27 0 U. S. 87 (925). "Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. i (1937).
:M'Ctulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316 (i8xg); United States v. Ferger, 25o U. S. x99
(1g8); Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 (I938); United
States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1940); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 11O (1942).
100 Houston R. Co. v. United States, 297 U. S. 288 (936).
101Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (194i); Wickard v. Filburn, 302 U. S. i (1937); Cloverleaf
v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148 (1942).
202 See Tarney, supra note 9o; Binzer, Civil Aviation-The Relative Scope of Iurisdiction of the
State and Federal Government (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 276.
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It is also apparent that this Federal legislation could best take the form of asserting
exclusive Federal jurisdiction. It seems inconceivable that the states should be
allowed to impose the unreasonable burden of varieties of economic regulations on
the air transportation industry.'0 3 Years of conflict and court litigation can be pre-
vented by such legislation if adopted now before the states begin to assert jurisdiction
in this field.
(C) Airports-Airport Zoning
All of the states have legislation authorizing their local political sub-divisions-
usually cities-to acquire and operate airports."' Further and more detailed refer-
ence is made to this subject later on in discussing local jurisdiction.
Thirty-six states have legislation authorizing the promulgation of zoning regula-
tions to control the height of structures erected in airport approach areas. 10 This
type of legislation is also given more extended consideration in the next section
herein on local jurisdiction.
(D) Tort Liabilities
Some states have asserted jurisdiction over aviation accident liabilities. Arkan-
sas,' °6 Georgia, 0M and Pennsylvania'08 have adopted statutes providing that an air-
craft operator's liability to his passengers is governed by the rules applicable to torts
on land. California0 9 and South Carolina"0 have statutes restricting the right of
guest passengers in airplanes to recover for injuries suffered, and a Maryland statute
exempts operators engaged in interstate or foreign commerce from liability for in-
juries caused by faults of navigation, dangers of the air and acts of God when the
aircraft has a proper crew and is airworthy."'
Section 5 of the "Uniform State Law for Aeronautics," which was prepared by
a committee of the American Bar.Association in conjunction with the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by both organ-
izations in 1922, imposes the rule of absolute liability for damages by aircraft to
persons or property on land or water, unless the injury is caused in whole or in
"0'See McDonald and Kuhn, The Ocean Air-State or Federal Regulation (1945) 31 VA. L. Rav.
363, 374; Ryan, id. at 522.
"'
0 See STATE LAwS RELATING To AIRPORTS, AIRPORT ZONING, AIR NAVIGATION FACILITIES: IN FORCE
JULY 1, 1944 (National Aeronautic Association 1944); WATERMAN, Op. cit. supra note 36; and RilrN,
AIRPORTS AND TIE COuRTS (944).
10' See RHIYNE, id. at 171 for a list of these acts adopted before 1945. In 1945 Delaware, North
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Washington adopted new airport zoning acts. Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, clarified or
expanded acts which had already been adopted in those states.
' Ark. Laws x941, Act 457, 1941 U. S. Av. R. 341 at 348.
""
7 Ga. Laws 1933, Act 2o6, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 421 at 423.
1
° Pa. Laws 1933, Act 224, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 476 and 485.
'osSee discussion and interpretation of this provision in Whittemore v. Lockheed Corp., 51 Cal.
App. (2d) 6o5, 125 P. (2d) 531 (942) and further decisions in this case 149 P- (2d) 212, 151 P. (2d)
670 (1944).
... S. Car. Laws 1935, Act 42, 1935 U. S. Av. R. 421.
"
1 Md. Laws 1931, Ch. 403, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 365.
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part by the person injured." 2 This statute, where it is in effect, does import into
the law of the particular state a different legal rule for injuries of this kind as com-
pared with injuries caused by mid-air collisions, injuries aboard aircraft, and injuries
to aircraft by other instrumentalities.
In four"' of the twenty-three states"14 which have adopted this Uniform Statute
on surface injuries, this section has been amended to remove the absolute liability
provision and to base liability on the rules of torts on land. Two states make proof
of injury to persons and property on the ground prima facie evidence of negli-
gence." In Missouri, this section was entirely eliminated when the Uniform Law
was adopted,"' and in Colorado"17 and Georgia"' this section was not adopted
when certain other provisions of the Uniform Law were enacted. The fourteen
states," and Hawaii, which have the absolute liakility provision incorporated in
their law should recognize the present status of aviation as an ordinary mode of
travel by deleting this provision from their statutes.
Section 6 of the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics of i922 provides: "The
liability of the driver of one aircraft to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts
or passengers on either aircraft, for damage caused by collision on land or in the air,
shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to torts on land."'12  Twenty
states have adopted this section.' 21 In cases involving collisions of airplanes on the
ground, the courts of states which have not adopted' this provision have held that
the general common law rules governing liability for accidents on land will be
applied in aviation cases.
Seventeen states' 22 and Hawaii now have in force the provisions of Section 4
:12 11 UNiF. LAws ANN. (r938) §5, PP. x61-i62; text is also found in 1928 U. S. Av. R. 472-476.
.. Arizona (uses the word "Negligence" to reach this legal effect) Laws 1929, Ch. 38, 1929 U. S.
Av. R. 403 at 4o6; Ark. Laws 1941, Act 457, 1941 U. S. Av. R. 341, 347; Idaho Laws 1931, Ch. zoo,
i931 U. S. Av. R. 335; and Pa. Laws 1933, Act 224, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 476 at 484. See Kadylak v.
O'Brien, 1941 U. S. Av. R. 9 (U. S. D. C. W. D. Pa. 1941)-not officially reported, applying the
Pennsylvania statute.
14 Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee Utah, Vermont and wisconsin-citations to all of these statutes are given in the table on
page 129 of 1944 U. S. Av. R.
... GA. CODE (1935) §N-xo5, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 42a; MD. CODE ANN. (1939) Art. IA, §5, Laws
1937, Ch. 528, 1937 U. S. Av. R. 631. See Birckhead v. Simmon, 171 Md. 178, 189 A. 265 (0936)
holding the Maryland statute inapplicable to airports.
"'
8 P. L. 122, Laws x929, Mo. Rav. STATs. 1929, §13905-13915 (Aug. 27, 1929).
. Colo. Laws 1937, Ch. 8I.
11
'P. L. 99, Laws 1933, GA. CODE 1933, §1I-1O-11-1O (1933)-
... Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See 1944 U. S. Av.
R. i29 for table giving citations to all statutes.
i20 ix UNiF. LAws ANN. (1938) §6, p. 163; 1928 U. S. Av. R. 472-476.
" Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Vermont and Wisconsin. Full citations to each state statute are given in the table on page E29
of 1944 U. S. Av. R.
1.. Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Car-
olina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin,
Wyoming. See 1944 U. S. Av. R. 129 for tables giving citations to all statutes.
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of the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics of 1922. This provides that the landing
of an aircraft on the lands of another, without his consent, is unlawful unless it is
a "forced landing"; and in the case of a "forced landing," the owner of the aircraft
is absolutely liable. Six states make unauthorized landing of an aircraft on the land
of another unlawful except in case of a "forced landing." '128 Of these six states,
Arizona, Idaho and Pennsylvania provide that liability for the damage caused by
such landings shall be determined by the rules of torts on land, Maryland makes the
aircraft owner prima facie liable unless he proves the injury was not caused by his
negligence or by the negligence of someone acting for him, and Arizona and Mis-
souri do not specify what legal rules are applicable.
Other provisions of this Uniform Law have already proved to be unsound,12 4
and a general rewriting of this Uniform Law to bring it up to date was undertaken
by the American Bar Association, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and the American Law Institute through a joint committee. 2 A series
of hearings and meetings were held in 1937 and a tentative draft of a "Uniform
Aeronautical Code" was completed.'m In July, 1938, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved "The Uniform Aviation Liability
Act," but gave its Executive Committee authority to withhold promulgation of the
Act if anything came to its attention which warranted such action. The American
Bar Association and the American Law Institute had previously withdrawn from
the participation in the work of the joint committee.' This new proposed Uni-
form Act imposes a rule of absolute liability "regardless of negligence" for damage
by aircraft to persons and limits the amount which can be recovered. After the
adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the Executive Committee of the Com-
missioners voted to withhold the promulgation of their new Act, acting under author-
ity conferred by the Conference, until the newly created Civil Aeronautics Authority
could study the Act and submit recommendations on its provisionsY8s
The Civil Aeronautics Authority assigned a member of its legal staff to make a
study of proposed aviation liability legislation. When the Reorganization Order
reorganized the Civil Aeronautics Authority, the study went along with the func-
tions of the new Civil Aeronautics Board. This study was completed in 1941,12D
but the war and its attendant emergencies have caused the Civil Aeronautics Board
to delay action upon the recommendations made therein. These recommendations
call for a Federal act to cover most aviation tort liabilities. Completion of this
'
23 Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Maryland and Pennsylvania.
... See RmNE, op. dt. supra note 104, at 109-113, 154-157.
25 See Report of the Standing Committee on Aeronautical Law (1937) 66 A. B. A. R. 222.
12
'For the full texts of the three acts comprising this code: i.e., "Uniform Aviation Liability Act,"
"Uniform Law of Airflight," and 'Uniform Air Jurisdiction Act," see HoTcmuss, TREATISE ON AVIATMoN
L-w (1938) PP. 459-499.
"
7 See Report of the Standing Committee on Aeronautical Law (1942) 67 A.B. A. R. x86.
'8 Ibid. ,
129 See SWEENEY, REPORT TO TnE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD OF A STUDY OF PROPOSED AVIATION
Isanrrm LEGI.SLA o (1941).
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study and recommendations on legislation for aviation accident liabilities is high on
the C. A. B.'s post-war agenda.
,The above brief review certainly indicates that the Uniform Act of 1922 has not
brought uniformity into the aircraft liability field, and it further demonstrates the
weakness in any plan calling for state action. All the states will not adopt any
"uniform" act which is proposed to replace the x922 Act, so Federal legislation is
essential if real uniformity is to be achieved.
A Federal Bill was introduced in 1943 to be known as the "Air Carriers Liability
Act of 1943" which would have brought partial uniformity into the aviation tort
liability field by providing Federal jurisdiction over all claims for bodily injuries or
death in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce'3 ° A similar Bill is now pend-
ing in Congress.' 3 '
(E) Workmen's Compensation
The liability of companies engaged in the aviation business, whether in the
manufacturing of planes or the operation thereof, for damages for injury or death
of employees has been subject only to legislation by the states. The Federal Gov-
ernment has no statute defining the liabilities of air carriers engaged in interstate
commerce for the injury or death of their employees. In most of the states at the
present time, there is in effect various workmen's compensation laws, most of which
while containing no specific reference to aviation, are broadly enough drafted so
that they have been held applicable to pilots, mechanics and others engaged in
aviation 32
It has occasionally been urged that aviation is so inherently dangerous that it is
without the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Statutes. This argument has
been rejected, however, and it has been held that such a statute is applicable where
death results from an airplane accident'3 3
The question of whether the injury was sustained while the employee was acting
in the usual course of his employment is not, of course, peculiar to aviation busi-
ness. It has been decided that a mechanic whose duty it was to taxi planes in and
out of the hangar was killed "in the course of his employment" where the accident
was due to an impromptu flight'3 4 So also was a theater manager held to be en-
gaged "in the course of his employment" where he made the flight in question for
advertising purposes and with the consent of his employer 3 5  However, where a
.. H. R. XO2, 78th Cong., ist Sess., Sec. 58. See discussion of this legislation in Hearings Before
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. XO2, 78th Cong., ist Sess. (1943) 249-271.
H. R. 532, 79th Cong., ist Sess. (1945).
See cases cited infra notes 133-139; Ross, The Problem of Workmen's Compensation in Air
Transportation (1935) 6 J. o Arip L. x, and 48-69 where the author collects all workmen's compen-
sation laws affecting aviation; Zollman, Workmen's Compensation Acts and Aircraft Accidents (1935),
id. at 70.
" Stites v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 1928 U. S. Av. R. 312, 2 Cal. Acc. Comm. 653 (1915). See
also Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Arnold, i S. W. (2d) 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
"Smith v. Indemnity Commission, 1937 U. S. Av. R. 129 (Ohio App. 1937).
'Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Skytles, 47 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th 1931).
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pilot was flying in violation of regulations at the time of the accident, he was held
to have acted outside the scope of his employment and compensation was denied.180
That Workmen's Compensation Acts of the various states encompass aviation as
a business admits of little doubt so long as the "employment" is restricted within the
boundaries of the particular state. That air transportation is primarily long-distance,
interstate transportation is a fact reiterated many times in this article. Consequently,
it is of the utmost importance to determine whether a particular state's Workmen's
Compensation Act applies to injuries which occur without the state. In some states
the compensation act expressly provides for such a situation. Other states, such as
New York, have compensation statutes expressly prohibiting recovery under New
York law when the employee is permanently employed outside of the state. 37 How-
ever, an aerial photographer who traveled all over the United States but who was
hired in New York, from which state he received his instructions, supplies, and
pay was held by the New York court to have been "employed in New York" and
the New York Workmen's Compensation Act was held applicable, although the
accident in which he was killed occurred in California. 8 s Similarly, in an action
for damages for the wrongful death of plaintiff's intestate whose contract of em-
ployment was entered into under the laws of the State of Michigan and who, in the
course of his employment, was killed in the crash of an airplane in Illinois, full
faith and credit was extended to the laws of Michigan under which plaintiff, by
her election to accept an award of compensation under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of that state, divested herself of the right to maintain an action for wrong-
ful death in Illinois.'3 9 While the number of cases in which the extra-territorial
effect of Workmen's Compensation statutes has been in issue has been few, enough
have been decided to indicate that the tendency is to apply such statutes extra-
territorially.
There is no reason, however, why the Federal government could not assert juris-
diction to eliminate the jurisdictional questions which constantly arise in this
field.lo "'
(F) Ownership of Air Space
Some states have assumed jurisdiction by legislation over ownership of air space
and lawfulness of flight. Twenty-three states140 have adopted the provisions of the
Uniform Aeronautics Act of i921141 which states:
" Re Insurance Corp., 63 F. (ad) 36 (C. C. A. 5th 1933). See also Datin v. Vale, x93x U. S.
Av. R. 175 (Pa., not officially reported).
13" Baum v. New York Air Terminals, 230 App. Div. 531, 245 N. Y. S. 357 (1930).
3' Alexander v. Movieto-News, Inc., 273 N. Y. 511, 6 N. E. (2d) 604 (1937).
" Biddy, Admx. v. Blue Bird Air Service, 374 IIl. 5o6, 30 N. E. (2d) 14 (1940).
" See Hearings, supra note 53o, at 240-249, discussing a proposed amendment to the Civil Acro-
nautics Act of 1938 which would authorize the Civil Aeronautics Board to take appropriate action to
end present conflicts over which state law applies to air carrier employee injuries. See Pillsbury, Appli-
cation of Federal Compensation Acts to Aviation (1933) 4 Ant L. Rzv. 38.
1.. Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin; Hawaii has also adopted the Uni-
form Act.
ii UNIF. LAws AN-N. x6o (1938).
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"Sec. 3. Ownership of Space. The ownership of the space above the lands and waters
of this state is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject
to the right of flight described in Section 4.
"Sec. 4. Lawfulness of Flight. Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this
state is lawful unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to
which the land or water or the space over the land or water is put by the owner, or un-
less so conducted as to be eminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land
or water beneath."
In Massachusetts' 42 and Wyoming 43 statutory provisions substantially like the
1921 Uniform Act, but in different language, have been adopted, but in the other
states no legislation on ownership of air space exists.
This Uniform Law was approved in i921 with the endorsement of the American
Bar Association being given in i 92 2 .14' The American Bar Association's Committee
on Aeronautical Law soon found fault with the "ownership theory contained in the
above provisions of the 1921 Uniform Law, and in i93o the Association authorized
the committee to draft a new Uniform State Code. In 1931, the committee sub-
mitted a draft of a proposed Uniform Regulatory Act, but because of an intense
conflict of opinion over the ownership of air space problem, the Association's ap-
proval of this proposed act was not requested.I40
The Bar Association Committee's draft was submitted to the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for study. The Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws had proposed that a Uniform Aeronautical Code for adoption
by the states should be promulgated to cover a "Uniform Aviation Liability Act,"
"Uniform Law of Air Flight," and a "Uniform Air Jurisdiction Act." Of this pro-
posed new legislation, the section on air space ownership came in for the most vigor-
ous criticism' 47 because it was leaving out the "ownership" idea as to air space which
had been carried forward from the ad coelum maxim of the common law into the
i92i Uniform Law which it was intended to replace.
While this conflict was raging, the American Law Institute in 1934 adopted a
final draft of its Restatement of the Law of Torts, which in Section 194 carries for-
ward the ancient and discredited absolute ownership of air space concept which
originated in the ad coelum maxim.'48
In 1935, the American Bar Association and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners of Uniform State Laws each at its annual meeting, approved a "Uniform
State Regulatory Act" containing proposed new language to replace the 1921 Uni-
form Act and to eliminate the air space ownership idea" This "Uniform State
1"2Mass. Laws 1939, Ch. 393, Sec. 3. A commission to fix minimum altitudes for flight is pro-
vided for.
1 13 W'o. REV. STAT. (193) §4-105. 245 49 A. B. A. R. 97, 413 (1922).
240 56 A. B. A. R. 69, 317 (931).
... See Hayden, Objections to New Uniform Aeronautical Code (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 121; Hayden,
Airspace Property Rights Under the New Aeronautical Code (933) 4 AIR L. REV. 31.
"'8See Wherry and Condon, Aerial Trespass Under the Restatement of Torts (935) 6 AiR L. Rav.
113.
"' 6o A. B. A. R. II9 (i935); see Hayden, New Deal in Airspace Rights (1939) IO J. oF AR L. &
C. x58; Godehn, Brophy, Butler and Hale, Proposed Law of Airflight (1937-38) 8 J. op AIR L. 505, 9
id. at 154 et seq.
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Regulatory Act" and the "Uniform Law of Air Flight" of the proposed new "Uni-
form Aeronautical Code" are identical. The American Bar Association, in 1941,
however, voted to suspend further recommendation of enactment into law of this
"Uniform State Regulatory Act," with the idea that uniformity in the aviation field
might best be obtained through Federal legislation. 0
The Joint Legislative Drafting Committee of the Council of State Governments
and the United States Department of Justice are now working on a proposed "Harm-
less Flight of Aircraft Act" which provides "Flight in aircraft over lands and waters
of this state shall not give rise to a cause of action at law or in equity based upon a
trespass, unless damage other than nominal damage is alleged and proved." This
proposed Act if approved and sponsored for adoption by state legislatures will do
much to further the cause of civil aviation by eliminating much of the trouble aris-
ing out of the antiquated provisions of the 1921 Uniform State Law for Aeronautics.
(G) Taxation
State and local taxes on commercial air lines are almost exclusively of the follow-
ing types:'r' (i) Real property taxes; (2) personal property taxes; (3) net income
taxes; (4) capital stock taxes; (5) gross earning taxes; (6) payroll taxes; (7) gas-
oline taxes; (8) aircraft registration fees; (9) pilot license fees.
The air lines are subject to real property taxes in all states where they own such
property.1 52 However, they generally lease rather than own their hangars and traffic
solicitation offices and operate from municipally owned fields, with the result that
their direct payments of this type of tax are small in volume.
Personal property taxes are payable on at least the tangible personalty, such as
planes, office equipment, spare motors and fuel, in all states except: (i) Delaware,
New York and Pennsylvania, where all personal property is tax free, and (2) Idaho,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Hampshire, where planes are exempt
but some or most other tangible personalty is taxable. However, tangible personal
property, like other property, is taxable only where it is held to have its tax situs,
and few local assessors have asserted jurisdiction over the planes of the commercial
carriers.' 53
The tax situs of planes is subject to considerable question. There are at least
three conflicting theories on this subject. Some believe that planes operating in
more than one state are taxable only at the corporation's domicile; since most of the
airlines are domiciled in one of the states which exempts planes, this is about the
equivalent of holding that the planes of the interstate carriers are not taxable. Others
believe that planes are taxable only at the head office of the airline, the "commercial
66 A. B. A. R. 148, 221 (1941). For an extensive consideration of this subject and a collection
of all the court decisions see RHYNE, op. ct. supra note 104, at 82-163.
2113See C. A. B., MULTIPLE TAXATIoN OF AIR COMMERCE (a report to Congress), H. Doc. No. 141,
7 9 th Cong., ist Sess. (1945) 14 et req.; Thompson, State and Local Taxation Aflecting Air Transporta-
tion (933) 4 J. oF AIR L. 497.
... MuITIPLE TAx -roN oF AIR COMMERCE, supra note 150, at 17 et seq.
'53 See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, infra note 155.
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domicile." This theory exempts the planes of several large companies whose head
offices are in New York and Pennsylvania, two of the states which tax no personal
property. A third theory holds that a state may tax as property a fractional part of
the fleet of any airline using a port within the state, the fraction being computed as
the ratio of route miles in the state to total route miles or in some other fashion
reasonably designed to divide the fleet fairly among the states of operation.
The last theory of tax situs is the one which is likely to result in the most com-
plete taxation of air line property. It is the theory now used in taxing railroad prop-
erty. Thus far, only eight states have laws providing for this type of taxation of
air line property. These states are: Kentucky, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon,
Utah, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. In these eight states, the property,
both real and personal, is assessed by the state tax department rather than by local
assessors, although most of the taxes collected on the assessment go to local
governments.
Corporations operating airlines are subject to net income tax in thirty states and
the District of Columbia. Most of the remaining eighteen states do not have cor-
poration net income taxes on any corporation; however, three states-New York,
Oregon, and West Virginia-tax some corporations on this base but not airlines.
There has been some question, however, whether a state could tax the net income
of an airline which engaged in no intrastate commerce, with the result that there
has been less taxation on this base than might be expected from the above figures.
Furthermore, several of the most important air fields in the country are in states
which have no corporation net income taxes, such as Florida, Illinois, Michigan,
New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, and Washington.
Capital stock taxes are just about as widespread as corporation net income taxes.
There is also the same constitutional question concerning an airline which engages
in no intrastate commerce. For this reason, and for the further reason that capital
stock taxes are usually moderate in rate, the states derive very little from this levy
on airlines.
Gross earnings taxes are applicable to airlines in only eight states-Arizona,
Indiana, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and West
Virginia. It has been assumed by all of these states that they could not tax receipts
from interstate commerce, and only a few of them, notably New York and Penn-
sylvania, have enough intrastate commerce to derive appreciable revenues from this
source.
The airlines are subject to state unemployment compensation taxes on the same
basis as other employers of the requisite number of persons. Aside from the fact
that this tax accounts for the largest segment of the airlines' state and local tax bills,
there is nothing peculiar about its application to these carriers.
Twenty-one states impose some tax on gasoline used in aircraft' 54 In just over
' See MOTOR FUEL TAXEs As APPLIED TO GASOLINE CoNsumEDi By AIRPLANEs---JNuARY 1 1945-
FXEMIPONS----E uNs-DIsPOSiTiON (Air Transport Association 1945).
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half of these, the tax is the regular state motor fuel tax that is applicable to gasoline
used on the highways; in the others, the tax is imposed at a lower rate. Kentucky,
while taxing aviation fuel used by planes operating locally, exempts fuel used in
scheduled flights by planes operating in interstate commerce. Virginia refunds the
tax on fuel which is purchased in the state, but is still in the tank when the plane
leaves the state. In the other nineteen states, the tax is collected on all fuel pur-
chased or withdrawn from storage in the state, whether used in the state or beyond
its boundaries. There is adequate support for this practice in Supreme Court
decisions. 542
Aircraft registration fees are generally purely nominal fees, from which planes
licensed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, or used in interstate commerce,
or owned by non-residents are often exempt. Connecticut, Idaho, and Michigan are
the only states with levies higher than $io a plane (in the latter two states, the regis-
tration charge is in lieu of property taxes), and apparently none of the airlines under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board pays fees in any of these three states.
The pilot license fees are usually collectible only from persons not licensed by the
Civil Aeronautics Administration and therefore produce little revenue in the aggre-
gate and virtually none from the interstate carriers.
In the only aviation tax case of national import, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that Minnesota could tax all of the planes of Northwest Airlines where
that airline used this state as its "home port."-"' Northwest is a corporation char-'
tered in Minnesota with its principal offices and overhauling base located in St. Paul.
It operates interstate airlines, carrying persons, property and mail over scheduled
routes fixed by the Civil Aeronautics Board extending from Chicago to the west
coast. Fourteen per cent of the air miles and sixteen per cent of the plane miles
were flown within the borders of Minnesota. The planes are registered with the
Administrator and St. Paul is listed as their "home port." Except when being over-
hauled, they were used continuously and interchangeably over the entire route. For
the year 1939, Minnesota assessed and taxed all planes of Northwest at their full
value.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in which three other Justices concurred,
based the decision upon the rule that the domicile of the owner of tangible personal
property has jurisdiction to tax the property so long as it has not acquired a per-
manent situs in another state. Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion rests upon
the analogy between airplanes and vessels and selected as the most practical rule that
formerly applied to vessels, making them taxable only at their home port. Mr.
Chief Justice Stone, who wrote the dissenting opinion, in which three other Jus-
tices joined, was of the opinion that on the facts a proportion of the planes had
acquired a situs beyond the jurisdiction for tax purposes, being permanently within
the jurisdiction of the other states through which the routes passed, and thus a tax
I.'.Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Com., 285 U. S. 147 (932). And ef.
American Ainvays v. Grosjean, 3 F. Supp. 995 (E. D. La. 1933).
... Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944).
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on this proportion would be an undue burden on interstate commerce inasmuch
as it would subject that portion to multiple taxation merely because it was used in
interstate commerce' 50
(H) Other State Jurisdiction
In addition to aviation subjects already considered above, the states have asserted
jurisdiction in a number of other aviation fields. The twenty-three states adopting the
Uniform State Law for Aeronautics have also enacted the sections of that law giving
the state jurisdiction over crimes committed 5 " or contracts made 59 while in flight
over the state. This Act as adopted by these states also makes dangerous flying' 6 °
and hunting'' from aircraft a misdemeanor. Some states have special insurance
laws for aviation,1 2 and miscellaneous laws on various crimes committed in or by
those operating aircraft, aviation education in public schools, transportation of liquor
and a wide variety of other laws which are specifically enacted for or are made spe-
cifically applicable to civil aviation'3 3
III. LOCAL JURISDICTION
(A) Airport Acquisition
While the Federal government has exercised the predominant role, the part
played by municipalities in the development of civil aviation certainly ranks next
in importance. It is the cities who have worked with the Federal government in
the development of airports' 64 Without airports, there could be no aviation so the
part played by cities is indeed an important one. The state governments, as such,
have expended only 2 per cent of the money spent on the airports which have been
developed up to the present time, as states have been content to adopt legislation
authorizing their cities to finance airports out of city funds.0 5
Nearly all cities have been authorized by state statutes or charter provisions to
acquire and operate airports. "' Cities have in many instances also been given the
jurisdiction to acquire, airports outside their corporate limits,1 7 to operate airports
.. The decision is discussed elsewhere in this symposium. Welch, The Taxation of Air Carriers,
infra, p. 584.
' Sec. 7 of the Uniform Act, 1i UNIF. LAws ANN. (938) 164.
... See. 8, ibid. "'0 Sec. 9, ibid. ... See. io, id. at 165.
1"-1These insurance laws are all cited in the comprehensive digest of state aviation legislation in
1944 U. S. Av. R., pp. 131-174.
10' For reference to all of these state statutes, see 1944 U. S. Av. R.
10' NAT'L AERONAUTIC ASS'N, JOINT AIRPORT Usis CONFERENCE PROCEnoINGs (1944) 136.
18. Hearings Before Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce (Senate) on S. 2 and S. 34, 7 9 th
Cong., ist Sess. (March 13-23, 1945) 153.
108 RiNE, op. cit. supra note 104, at 17-45.
.0. State ex rel. Walla Walla v. Clausen, 157 Wash. 457, 289 Pac. 61 (1930); City of Spokane v.
Williams, 157 Wash. i2o, 288 Pac. 258 (1930); McLaughlin v. City of Chattanooga, 177 S. W. (2d)
823 (Tenn. 1944), where the land which Chattanooga acquired was located in the State of Georgia;
Fishel v. City and County of Denver, io6 Colo. 576, io8 P. (2d) 236 (1940); Howard v. City of
Atlanta, 19o Ga. 730, 10 S. E. (2d) 193 (1940) ; In the Matter of Petition of City of Detroit, 14 N. W.
(2d) 140 (Mich. 1944).
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jointly with other cities,"6 and to create special airport authorities to serve entire
metropolitan areas.169
(B) Regulations Governing Use of Airports
Having acquired airports, cities must adopt local safety regulations to supple-
ment the Federal Air Traffic Rules, 70 and any state air traffic regulations which may
exist,, if local conditions make this desirable. There can be little doubt of the juris-
diction of a county or city which owns an airport to prescribe necessary local safety
regulations governing landing, taking off, taxiing, parking, flight restrictions, light-
ing, fire prevention, starting of engines of aircraft, and fees for use of airport facil-
ities. 7 Such local regulations are valid if they do not conflict with Federal or state
regulations on the same subject,172 and the Federal and state governments have
issued only general rather than local rules up to the present time.
A city may deny use of its publicly owned airport to a pilot who has violated
local regulations for use of the airport' 73 and a concession operator on the airport
may refuse to sell gasoline to this pilot if he lands on the airport in spite of the city's
order prohibiting him the use of the field.' 74 A city may regulate solicitation of
passengers by taxicabs at its airport and may require the payment of a fee for the
privilege of making such solicitation. 5 A city may regulate the conduct of those
using an airport owned by it even though the airport is located outside of its cor-
porate limits.178
(C) Low Flights Over Cities
Many cities have ordinances prohibiting low flights over their corporate lim-
its' 77 These ordinances have not yet been tested in the courts on conflict with
Federal and state regulations, but the courts may well consider these regulations as
.. Ragsdale v. Hargraves, x98 Ark. 614, 129 S. W. (2d) 967 (1939); see Jarz, Intermunicipal Co-
operation in Establishing, Maintaining and Operating Airports (x941) 12 J. oF Am L. & COMM. 301.
... Erickson v. King, 218 Minn. 98, x5 N. W. (2d) 2oi (1944); Miles v. Lec, 284 Ky. 39, 143 S. W.
(2d) 843 (940); People v. Bartholf, 388 Ill. 445, 58 N. E. (2d) 172 (1944) and the case of People
ex rel. Curren v. Wood, - Ill. - , 62 N. E. (2d) 809, 1o M. L. J. 86 (Sept. 19, 1945), which
upholds a later Illinois statute; Monterey Peninsula Airport District v. Mason, ig Cal. (2d) 446, 121 P.
(2d) 727 (1942).
~o See Federal Air Traffic Rules, 235 C. C. H. 9o6o.o-9o6o.94, 14 CODE FED. REos. (Cum. Susp.)
§6o.
...In City of Spokane v. Williams, 157 Wash. 120, 288 P. 258 (1930) the Court said:
"Patrons of the field, whether they be owners of property abutting upon it or not, have no right in
making use of the field to enter it with their ships except at places and in the manner provided by the
rules and regulations of the City and its managers and agents in control of the field, which regulations
may be changed from time to time as necessity and safety may require."
" Rinehart v. Woodward Flying Service, 122 W. Va. 392, 9 S. E. (2d) 521 (1940).
175 Green v. Messer, 243 Ala. 405, 10 S. (2d) 157 (1942).
""
4 Messer v. Southern Airways Sales Co., 17 So. (2d) 679 (Ala. 1944). Here the Court said in
part: "Patrons of a municipal airport have no right to make use of the field except in accordance with
reasonable rules and regulations adopted by the City for its operation."
.. Weinstein v. McKenzie, io6 N. Y. L. J. 1458 (N. Y. Sup. CL, N. Y. Co. Nov. 12, 1941).
"" Silverman v. City of Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 642, 57 S. W. (2d) 552 (1933). See Elbrite v.
Crawford, 215 Cal. 724, 12 P. (ad) 937 (1932).
...MchNTiR AND RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND AIRPLANES AND THE LEGAL PROBLEMS THEY CREATE 'OP.
CmEs (1939) (NIMLO Report No. 42).
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valid under city police power and supplementary to rather than in conflict with
Federal and state regulations' 78 A New York statute fixing heights below which
aircraft cannot fly over congested areas has been upheld as g proper exercise of the
state's police power and held not to be an interference with interstate commerce7'
These ordinances generally fix height limits below which it is unlawful to fly air-
craft and prohibit the following: acrobatic, dangerous, and unusual flying, landings
at other than regularly established airports, operation without lights at night, noise
and loudspeaking devices, flights over the central part of the city, flights by student
pilots over the city, the dropping of objects from airplanes, and the carrying of
explosives' 80
Some of these city ordinances provide that, if a permit is first obtained, exhibition
flights may be made over the city, banners can be carried, and circulars dropped
from airplanes.' 8 In the only case which has arisen on this type of ordinance, the
court held that a city police commissioner could temporarily suspend all permits for
the operation over the city of aircraft towing banners 8 2 The suspension was made
after a plane towing a banner made a forced landing near a congested beach en-
dangering the safety of thousands of people.
(D) Zoning to Protect Airport Approaches
Another jurisdiction exercised by municipalities in the aviation field is the adop-
tion of zoning regulations to prevent obstructions in the approaches of public air-
ports s'z While there has been a Bill introduced in the Congress which gave the
Federal government jurisdiction over this subject' and the Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration once announced a decision that states should do the zoning, 85 it is
now apparently conceded by the Federal and state governments that this is a matter
of peculiar local application and local governments should do the zoning. Local
industrial, residential, and other districts vary from city to city, as do the physical
surroundings of each airport, so each airport is a peculiar problem making state and
national zoning impractical without regard to legal considerations. The Federal
Bill was rewritten and reintroduced without the zoning provision,8 6 and both the
Federal government and state governments now sponsor a Model Airport Zoning
Act for adoption by state legislatures which authorizes cities to adopt zoning regula-
""See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, 1941 U. S. Av. R. 191 (Nov. 8, 1944); Smith v.
New England Aircraft Co., 269 Mass. 639, 17o N. E. 385 (1930).17 People v. Katz, 140 Misc. 46, 249 N. Y. S. 719 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1931).
180 See McIN-mE AND RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 177, at 21-22. In Silverman v. City of Chattanooga,
supra note 176, an ordinance prohibiting low flights was held to be a valid exercise of the City police
power.
.. McIhsRrs mD RHYNE, op. eit. supra note 177, at 22-23.
182 S. S. Pike, Inc. v. City of New York, 169 Misc. 1o9, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 957 (1938).
182 See generally RHYNE, op. eit. supra note 104, at 164-190.
"'H. R. 1012, 78th Cong., ist Sess. (943); Smylie, Constitutionality of Federal Airport Zoning
Bill (1943) 12 GEo. VAs. L. Rav. i.
18. MacChesney, Model Airport Zoning Act (1941) 12 J. oF AIR L. & CoM. 172, and Letter in same
issue at p. 182.
... H. R. 3420, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
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tions to protect airport approaches. 8s Thirty-six states now have adopted the Model
Act or some similar legislation on this subject' 8  It has been held that an ordinance
zoning the area around a city airport is invalid in the absence of an enabling statute
on this specific subject," 9 so adoption of such a statute is highly desirable in most
states. In some states cities have such a broad grant of powers that they can zone
around airports without such a statute but even in these states the statute will re-
move all argument as to the existence of this authority.
Airport zoning ordinances generally provide that no structures above specified
heights may be erected within specific distances of a specific airport' ° The heights
of permitted structures are allowed to increase on a graduated scale with distance
from the field' 1
In two cases airport zoning ordinances have been approved by dictum where
courts were passing on other questions.' 2 In the first case an airport zoning ordi-
nance was held invalid because there was no state statute authorizing such a regu-
lation,' 3 and in the second case an ordinance prohibiting erection of buildings
higher than 5 feet within ioo feet of an airport's boundaries was held to be con-
fiscatory and invalid.' 4 It is submitted that the courts should uphold zoning regu-
lations to protect airport approaches as a reasonable exercise of the police power of
state and local governments. 95 Such regulations certainly promote and protect the
safety, convenience and general welfare of the whole community in which a public
airport is located.' 0 If the community is without air transportation, it will cer-
tainly become a "ghost" town in the near future as such transportation is now essen-
tial to commercial progressj 9 7  Justice Cardozo in 1928, in the infancy of aviation
as we know it today, stated in one of his most famous court opinions that:18
1 8 7 See SUGGESTED STATE WAR LEiOsLArsoN (944-1945), prepared by a joint legislative drafting com-
mittee of the Council of State Governments and the United States Department of Justice which contains
this Model Airport Zoning Act as one of the Acts recommended by Federal and State governments for
adoption by state legislatures.
... See supra note 105.
..9 Yara En ineering Corp. v. City of Newark, 40 A. (2d) 559 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1945); Rice v. City
of Newark, 40 A. (2d) 561 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1945).
1 o See RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 104, at 174-175.
191 Ibid.
19'United States V. 357.25 Acres of Land, 235 C. C. H. §x883 (U. S. IV. D. La. 1944) holding that
a verdict of "no dollars" as the value of certain air space rights, sought by the Federal government in con-
demnation proceedings, was correct since an airport zoning ordinance prohibited erection of structures
within the air space in question; Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 3xi Mass. 628, 42 N. E. (2d) 575
(1942) wherein the Court, in holding that adjacent landowners were entitled to an injunction against
a private airport's operator, inferred that the Massachusetts Airport Zoning Act should be used to pro-
tect airport approaches it said: "It should be remembered, however, that the -statute, in 40-A-4ox now
contains adequate provisions for securing and regulating the approach to public airports."
2 United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, supra note 192.
"' Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., ibid.
... The legal authorities which support this idea are collected in RLYNE, op. cit. supra note 104, at
x64-i9o.
... Hunter, The Relation of Airport Zoning to Community Planning and Zoning (5940) C. A. A.
Airports Service Release.
"" Grant, Constitutionality of Zoning Law Enacted to Protect Airport Approach"v (1942) 53 J. OF
Anx L. & CoM. 272.
... Hesse v. Rath, 249 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342 (1928).
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"Aviation is today an established method of transportation. The future, even the near
future will make it still more general. The city that is without the foresight to build the
ports for the new traffic may soon be left behind in the race of competition. Chalcedon
was called the city of the blind because its founders rejected the nobler site of Byzantium
lying at their feet. The need for vision of the future in the governance of cities has not
lessened with the years. The dweller within the gates, even more than the stranger from
afar, will pay the price of blindness."
Where a city expends a large sum of money on a public airport for the benefit of
the community as a whole, that public investment can be lost if high structures in
the airport's approaches make it unsafe to use the field. The entire community
would suffer from the loss of air transportation. Surely the principles of law which
the courts have developed to sustain general zoning and planning of cities, to the
effect that the individual property owner can be restricted in the use of his land if
the restriction is for the benefit of the community as a whole,9 9 applies with great
force to the zoning of approaches to public airports. If certain areas of a city can
be set aside for industrial uses, others for residential uses and still others for other
specific uses in the interest of community benefit by making the best available use
of a city's area, it certainly seems that the setting aside of an area for airport use
is of the same general type of community planning. The community needs full use
of its airport so the individuals in the airport approaches give up some uses of their
property for the benefit of the community as a whole. The Supreme Court of the
United States in the famous Euclid case upheld zoning as a police power regulation
rather than a taking of property on the community benefit theory, thereby once
again recognizing that property rights are relative rather than absolute. ° ° These
legal principles lead one to conclude that the courts will uphold regulations zoning
airport approaches if the specific regulations are reasonable.
.0 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); 3 McQuILLIN, MuNIcIPAL COR-
PoPATioNs (2d ed. 1943) §1027 et seq.; BAsSrr, ZONING (1940); SMITHr, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE
(1937).
00 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 199.
